Contingent Fee Business Litigation Blog : Houston Patent & Contingent Fee Business Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : McClanahan Myers Espey Law Firm : Intellectual Property, Commercial Litigation

On February 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion in the case Richard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The case was filed by the estate of a former Wal-Mart employee to recover life insurance benefits that Wal-Mart received from its “corporate-owned” policies; sometimes called “dead peasant” policies. The estate sued under a Louisiana statute that allows estates to recover policy benefits when the designated beneficiary (in this case Wal-Mart) did not have an “insurable interest” in the insured person’s life.     

The district court held that the suit was subject to a one-year statute of limitations and dismissed it for being filed too late. But the court of appeals reversed, holding that the suit was timely under Louisiana’s ten-year statute of limitations. (Read the court’s opinion).

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STOLI is an acronym for “stranger-owned life insurance” or “speculator-owned life insurance.” It is a shorthand reference for transactions in which someone buys insurance on his own life for the purpose of selling it to a third party, often an unrelated investor, once the policy’s contestability period has expired. A recent ruling by a federal court in New Jersey, however, may undermine the security of such investments.

In a STOLI transaction, the insured person typically gets cash for the policy and the investor receives the right to the policy benefits when the insured person dies. Life insurers loathe the transactions because investors are unlikely to let STOLI policies lapse, meaning that insurers will have to pay death benefits on a greater percentage of insurance contracts than they have become accustomed. 

On January 27, 2009, the United States District Court for New Jersey became one of the first courts to weigh-in on what may become a recurring topic of litigation—an insurer’s effort to rescind one of its life insurance policies because of the possibility that it would be sold in a secondary market in a STOLI transaction. 

In Lincoln National Life Insurance Company v. Calhoun, Lincoln National sued to rescind a $3 million policy on the life of Walter Calhoun. First, the insurer argued that the policy is void because Calhoun intended—at the time he applied for the policy—to sell it to “stranger investors” in the secondary life insurance market, thereby removing the necessary insurable interest.  Second, Lincoln National argued that Calhoun made a material misrepresentation in his application by falsely stating that he had not discussed the possible sale or assignment of the policy in a secondary market.  

The court held that Lincoln National properly stated a case, noting that a material misrepresentation on the policy application may be reason to void the policy. But more importantly, the court added that Lincoln National’s allegation of no insurable interest could also serve to void the policy. The court held, “Insureds begin to run afoul of the insurable interest requirement, however, when they intend at the time of the policy's issuance, to profit by transferring the policy to a stranger with no insurable interest at the expiration of the contestability period.” 

The impact of the court’s insurable interest holding could be enormous. The market for STOLI policies is now estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars. The court’s ruling that a policy may be void if the insured person intended, at the time of purchase, to transfer the policy to one without an insurable interest may undermine the security of those STOLI investments.     

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     Washington Mutual and Wachovia have two things in common. First, they were spectacular business failures. Second, they were two of the nation’s largest holders of “bank owned life insurance” or “BOLI” policies. The combination of these two facts creates interesting issues concerning the legality of the BOLI policies and who may benefit from the deaths of the banks’ former employees.

     Bank owned life insurance generally refers to policies that a bank purchases on the lives of its employees. But unlike traditional forms of life insurance, the bank designates itself as the policy beneficiary—meaning that the bank is entitled to the policy benefits when the insured employee dies. BOLI policies also remain in force even if the insured person no longer works for the bank. The policies are therefore similar to those often referred to as “dead peasant” or “janitor” insurance.

     Washington Mutual and Wachovia had enormous appetites for BOLI policies. As of June 30, 2008, Washington Mutual reported to the Office of Thrift Supervision that it maintained $5.072 billion in BOLI holdings. Wachovia likewise reported a staggering $14.575 billion of BOLI holdings.  Notably, those amounts are reported in cash surrender value, meaning that the policies’ benefit amounts are likely substantially higher.

     Washington Mutual’s assets were acquired by JP Morgan Chase in September and Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo earlier this month. These transactions create interesting questions concerning the validity of the policies on the lives of the former employees and who may profit from their deaths. 

     Assuming that the Washington Mutual and Wachovia employees consented to the BOLI policies on their lives (a big assumption indeed), Washington Mutual and Wachovia may have had the insurable interest necessary to support the BOLI policies. But what about JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo? WaMu and Wachovia employees, especially former employees who left long before the collapse, probably never imagined that Chase and Wells Fargo might one day benefit from their deaths. Thus, two issues surface. First, who will receive the BOLI policy benefits when WaMu and Wachovia’s former employees die? Second, if Chase and Wells Fargo are the expected beneficiaries of those policies, do they have the insurable interest necessary to ensure the policies’ validity? 

 For more information on this topic, please contact any of the firm's partners at mmellp.com.

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     Virtually every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes a person’s right to insure his or her own life and name another as the policy beneficiary, either through an assignment or express designation. The designated beneficiary or assignee is thereafter deemed to have an insurable interest in the insured person’s life by virtue of that designation or assignment. 

     In the context of life or viatical settlements, the requirement of an insurable interest is typically satisfied when the insured person assigns the policy to the purchaser. The insured person in a “stranger owned life insurance” or “STOLI” transaction may likewise satisfy the insurable interest requirement through designation or assignment. Thus, it is arguable that the beneficiary in both life settlement and STOLI transactions have an insurable interest in the insured person’s life because of the assignment—an act taken by the insured person himself.

     One matter absent from the current debate over life settlement and STOLI transactions, however, involves the maintenance of an insurable interest after a secondary transfer of the policy. Most contracts may be transferred time and time again. But life insurance policies are not like most contracts because the requirement of an insurable interest is a fundamental. It is therefore likely that the second (or third, or fourth) assignee of the life insurance contract will not have an insurable interest in the insured person’s life—the insured person did not assign the policy to the subsequent owner or name it as the policy beneficiary. And in many jurisdictions, the absence of an insurable interest renders the policy void as a wagering contract that violates public policy.

     To learn more about this topic, please contact any of the firm's partners at mmellp.com.

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     The appropriate use, or misuse, of certain life insurance products remains a hot topic of conversation. Earlier this year, Florida passed legislation about who may benefit from life insurance policies. The State of Washington recently banned “dead peasant” insurance. And more than twenty-five states are now analyzing regulations concerning life settlements and “stranger owned” life insurance.

     Policy makers addressing these issues should, first and foremost, consider the impact of human nature on transactions in which one may profit from the death of another. Human nature is a dangerous thing, writes George Will. There are few statements so consistently true. 

     Insurance products have been abused by speculators since the beginning of insurance itself. Life insurance is no different. And that vehicle, fueled by human nature, will always present a profit opportunity for the unscrupulous.

     One fascinating example of such unscrupulous speculation is a policy purchased by National Convenience Stores, Inc., the former operator of the Stop-N-Go chain of convenience stores. During the summer of 1991, NCS bought insurance on the lives of all its Texas employees. It also designated itself as the policy beneficiary and was entitled to $250,000 every time an employee died on the job. 
 

     At the time it bought the policy, NCS’ business was failing. It filed for bankruptcy protection just a few months later. In December of 1991, the company, according to one executive, “had no money in the bank.” 

     But while its core business was failing, NCS experienced a remarkable number of employee deaths. Six employees died during the policy term, mostly from robbery-related murders. NCS was paid $1.5 million in policy benefits. And because the policy premium was approximately $620,000, the bankrupt company profited by almost $900,000 because of employee deaths. The insurance broker who placed the policy and had to process the claims, suggested prayer a way to control the mounting losses.

     Notably, NCS decided not to invest in many safety devices because it stated that it could not afford them. It decided against bullet-proof glass and drop safes for stores in high-crime areas. It also decided against having multiple employees on duty during late-night hours when crime was highest. Once it emerged from bankruptcy, and after the policy term expired, NCS was acquired by a competitor that installed new safety devices. On-the-job deaths then decreased dramatically.
 

     The NCS example is worthy of consideration. Defenders of practices such as broad-based, leveraged, corporate owned life insurance often argue that the coverage poses no moral hazard because the corporate beneficiary would never murder its insured employees. But as the NCS policy demonstrates, murder is not the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry, the moral hazard, is whether one wagers on the early death of another. NCS made a substantial profit, not from murder, but by depriving its employees of a safe work environment. 

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     It is well-understood in modern society that a person may not use an insurance policy to profit from another's loss of life or property. One cannot, for example, insure the life of a NASCAR driver with the hope that he will be killed in the next race. Likewise, one cannot insure his neighbor’s house and then burn it down to receive the policy benefits. Modern laws exist to remove the incentive for wrongdoing through insurance policies. But using life and property insurance contracts to benefit from another person's misfortune has not always been prohibited. And that which we now accept as forbidden was, at one time, commonplace.

     The insurable interest doctrine, as recognized today, originated in English statutes designed to remove insurance contracts from the environment of gambling and the misconduct commonly associated with one having the ability to profit from another’s loss. As described in the Appleman insurance treatise, English underwriters of the eighteenth century insured marine risks without requiring the policy beneficiary to have an interest in the vessel or its cargo. The practice created an incentive to destroy the insured property by those expecting to receive insurance benefits from the loss. The English Parliament reacted to the situation in 1749 by enacting the Statute of George II (19 Geo. 2, ch. 37 (1746)), which recognized that “a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering” had caused “great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, [to] have . . . been fraudulently lost and destroyed . . . .” The statute sought to remedy the situation by declaring that assurances for shipping risks not supported by an interest, or by way of gaming or wagering, would be “null and void to all intents and purposes.”

     According to Appleman, enterprising Englishmen insured the lives of famous persons reported to be seriously ill and the “unfortunate gentlemen” accused of crimes punishable by death. The amount wagered was the policy premium and the gamble, obviously, was whether the insured person lived or died. 

     The wagers had a substantial, negative impact on the persons whose lives were insured. In his 1761 publication “The Mystery and Inquiry of Stock Jobbing,” Thomas Mortimer wrote:

The inhuman sport affected the minds of men depressed by long sickness; for when such persons, casting an eye over a newspaper for amusement saw that their lives had been insured in the Alley at 90 per cent, they despaired of all hopes; and thus their dissolution was hastened.

In 1774, Parliament enacted a statute (14 Geo. 3, ch. 48 (1774)) to discourage the “mischievous kind of gaming” on human life:

no insurance shall be made . . . on the life or lives of any person or persons, or on any other event or events whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, shall have no interest . . .. 

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